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RECENT JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHIES: A COMPOSITE REVIEW
OTIS P. DOBIE*
An English wag of the last century remarked that Death, for
judges, had acquired a new terror-inclusion- in Lord Campbell's
biographical series. Obviously, a facetious quip, as it is well known
that thespians on the public stage, Their Honors included, savor
publicity, preferably of the cloyingly sweet variety. Currently, many
Campbells have been active.
Charles Evans Hughes
The great Chief Justice of our time has been considerably recalled
in the period under review. Pusey,' in a lengthy readable treatment
that does not emphasize the legal, views Hughes as a liberal of circa
1910 who was uncomfortable but acquiescent amid the 1930's progres-
sions. Interesting tidbits include a moving account of Hughes' mission
to Holmes to request his resignation; bar letters to White complain-
ing of the vagueness of Holmes' opinions; the friendship of Hughes
with White and Harlan; Hughes' concern over the tendency of the
New Deal brethren to expansively construe statutes and approve
state taxes on interstate commerce movements. Pusey accepts, with
some reservation, Hughes' denial of pressuring Roberts at the height
of the Court-FDR crisis. Mason2 warns that the Pusey book was much
prepared under the Hughes eye. Mason sees Hughes as basically con-
servative and playing along with McReynolds & Co. as long as
possible. Perkins,3 in a single volume, also not emphasizing the legal,
paints Hughes as an early century liberal trying to correlate the New
Deal with its forerunners. Rodell 4 believes that Hughes got a tip-off of
the FDR court plan, and actively generalled the opposition. He sus-
pects that Hughes was embittered by his presidential defeat and the
mudslinging of the confirmation as Chief Justice.
All writers give Hughes high marks as an administrator who kept
trials and court conferences running smoothly and tautly.5 Frank-
furter 6 compares Hughes to Toscanini. Looking at the portraits of
*Professor of Law, University of Louisville.
1. CHARLES EVANS HUGHES. By Merlo J. Pusey. New York: MacMillan, 1951.
Pp. 741.
2. Mason, Charles Evans Hughes: An Appeal to the Bar of History, 6 VAND.
L. REv. 1 (1952).
3. CHARLES EvANs HUGHES AND AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC STATESSMANSIP. By
Dexter Perkins. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1956. Pp. xii, 190.
4. NnE. MEN. By Fred Rodell. New York: Random House, 1955. Pp. xii,
332. This volume, ostensibly a work on the Supreme Court qua institution, is
equally, and more joyously, biographical.
5. However, note some comment, HARLAN Fi sE STONE: PILLAR OF LAw. By
Alpheus T. Mason. New York: Viking Press, 1956. Pp. xiii, 809.
6. Frankfurter, Chief Justices I Have Known, 39 VA. L. REv. 883 (1956).
403
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Hughes, one is reminded of Charles James Fox' statement that "no
man could possibly/ be as wise as Lord Chancellor Thurlow looked."
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
Holmes' law may fade, as some of it has already, but he doubtless
will long remain a favorite of biography, thanks to his "character" and
his off-court quotables. There is endless fascination in the august
Justice who punctured pomposities, read French novels, and went to
burlesque shows; the stalwart of the old order who benignly frat-
ernized with the Figaro-ish young trumpeters of the new; the superb
writer so endearing to the literateurs who write biography. Moreover,
akin to Thomas Jefferson, George Santayana, and Bernard Shaw,
Holmes said something for everybody, epigrams of such vagueness
and diversity as to seemingly link with any doctrine (the writer re-
cently read of him linking to existentialism). This last, some years
back, brought charges that Holmes was linked to political totalitarian-
ism and legal and moral anarchy. Much of recent writing on Holmes
has been disciple refutation. For instance, Rodell 7 explains that, in
his Hobbesian, analytical, cynical passages, Holmes is merely recog-
nizing what is, not what he thinks ought to be. Wyzanski 8 regards
Holmes' whole life as reflecting democratic faith in man's capacity to
resolve his problems. Mendelson9 applauds Holmes for bringing
scepticism and humility to spark needed change in a dogmatic age.
Biddle'0 traces Holmes' scepticism and pragmatism to his upbringing in
the period of the flowering of New England. Hofstadter" praises
Holmes' recognition of the relativity of time, place, legal relations,
and of forces spiritual, material, and political. Lucey, 12 one of the
earlier critics, confirms his thesis that much in Holmes smacks of
dominant force, brutal Darwinism, and uncharted pragmatism.
The Holmes-Laski Letters13 have been extensively reviewed else-
where. This writer merely records his own dominant impression
which was one of pathos-the tragedy of an ancient who, more than
most, had isolated himself in a world of books save for a few young
"intellectuals" who paid him disciple-like court and amused him
with their ideas and talk. As one reviewer put it, Laski was one of
these few remaining windows on the world. His letters inundate
7. Rodell, Justice Holmes and His Hecklers, 60 YALE L.J. 620 (1951).
8. Wyzanski, The Democracy of Holmes, 7 VAND. L. REV. 311 (1954).
9. Mendelson, Holmes: Humility, Scepticism, and Democracy, 36 MINN. L.
REV. 343 (1952).
10. Biddle, Mr. Justice Holmes, in MR. JUSTICE (a composite of Supreme
Court vignettes, handsomely bound and portraited). Edited by Dunham and
Kurland. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956. Pp. 229.
11. Hofstadter, Justice Holmes: Exponent of Relativity, 42 A.B.A.J. 19 (1956).
12. Lucey, Holmes: Liberal, Humanitarian, Democratic? 39 GEO. L.J. 523
(1951).
13. HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS. Edited by M. deWolfe Howe. Cambridge: Ilar-
vard University Press, 1952. Pp. xvi, 1481.
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Holmes with book reviews, travelogues, gushing praise and tart com-
ment on personages, and somewhat exhibitionist accounts of the
doings of Harold Laski. Holmes is appreciative and amused, but hard
pressed to rejoin by refurbishing old thoughts and recollections.
Neither displayed the letter-writing verve of Holmes' old favorite,
Horace Walpole.
Finally, Konefsky,14 whose volume struck this reader as somewhat
over-long and repetitious, essays the formidable task of dealing
with three principal questions: the explanation of the team of Holmes
and Brandeis; the legal legacy of the pair; the endurance of the
legacy. He gives more or less the stock answer to the team query:
that Holmes' detachrfent, scepticism, "constitutionally, the electorate
can go to hell if it wants to" could join Brandeis' crusading zeal foi:
social justice to uphold the legislation of the time. To this, Konefsky,
clearly a Brandeis partisan, adds the implication that Brandeis was
the stronger character of the two and persuaded Holmes. He sees
Holmes' primary legacy in his judicial respect for legislation and his
reluctance to judicially interdict natural political and economic de-
velopments, while Brandeis' is his belief in the efficacy of legislation
to achieve social justice and his urgence of constant modernizing of
legal fundamentals: Konefsky finds the legacy effective since New
Deal days, but under going some re-orientations recently. In economic
thinking, Holmes is related to Adam Smith and Brandeis to John
Stuart Mill.
Louis D. Brandeis
Brandeis' centenary has just been observed, but the memorial ma-
terial was not available for this review. However, Frankfurter 5 re-
cently saluted the moral grandeur of Brandeis, his compassionate
devotion to the mass of mankind and his implementation of American
democracy with his insights into political and economic institutions.
Freund16 observes that while Brandeis upheld modern social legisla-
tion generally, perhaps he had personal qualms, as his philosophy
tended to prefer private rather than state action. Goldman 17 has
collected the "sayings" of Brandeis on various subjects. In the pref-
ace, Goldman, a rabbi, suggests that Brandeis correlated the tradi-
tions of American democracy and Judaism. Rodell' 8 marks Brandeis
as an austere and ruthless liberal of the early century.
14. THE LEGACY OF HOLMES AND BRANDEIS. By Samuel J. Konefsky. New
York: Macmillan, 1956. Pp. ix, 307.
15. Frankfurter, The Moral Grandeur of Justice Brandeis. N.Y. Times, Nov.
11, 1956, Magazine Section, p. 26.
16. Freund, Mr. Justice Brandeis, in MR. JUSTICE, op. cit. supra note 10.
17. THE WoRDs OF JUSTICE BRANDEIS. By Solomon Goldman. New York: H.
Schuman, 1956. Pp. xxi, 185.




The great Chief Justice was widely memorialized in 1955. The
Pregident and the Chief Justice urged the application of Marshall
principles of ordered liberty and freedom with stability to the
ideological conflicts of today.19 Corwin 0 was intrigued by the con-
servative Marshall framing theories of federal power for the use of
latter-day "radicals." Rodell2 ' sees Marshall as a self-made man who
boldly moulded law to make an America congenial to his kind.
Marshall's alma mater, William and Mary, has published a compos-
ite volume of anniversary comment. 2 The Chief Justice hails Mar-
shall's contributions to international law and economic federalism.
Carl Swisher reminds that Marshall's conservatism accurately re-
flected the prevailing views of his time, and that his neglect of com-
mon law precedents was due, not to ignorance, but to the dispute
over the application of the common law to American law; David
Mays discusses the precedents for Marbury v. Madison. Author N.
Holcombe wonders if Marshall was conservative or liberal; he had
no great respect for existing institutions; he indicated little, faith
in popular government, relying on the separation of powers for pro-
tection against tyranny; he sat out the drive for a bill of rights. Joseph
Dorfman examines Marshall's economic views: Marshall favored
paternalistic state aid to western settlement; he was a hard money
rnari who frowned upon public debt and debtor relief legislation.
Donald Morgan doubts that the Marshall Court was the one-man
affair of legend, especially after 1824 when the Jacksonian appointees
dissented and made Marshall compromise his views.
This last point dovetails with Crosskey23 who advances the thesis
that, contrary to legend, Marshall did not lead his court to strong
Federalist results, but rather fought a rear guard retreat in the face of
advancing anti-Federalist views, and that, again contrary to legend,
the Federalists wished a strict construction of the Constitution, whose
nationalistic terms they had procured, while the anti-Federalists
wished a loose construction to read in their tenets. Frankfurter2 hails
Marshall for his radiating nationalism.
Spencer Roane
Whether by accident or design, the Harvard Law Review, in
19. Eisenhower, The Spirit of John Marshall: Crusader for Ordered Liberty
and Justice, 41 A.B.A.J. 1005 (1955); Warren, Chief Justice John Marshall: A
Heritage of Freedom and Stability, 41 A.B.A.J. 1008 (1955).
20. Corwin, John Marshall, Revolutionist in Spite of Himself, 104 U. PA. L.
REv. 3 (1955).
21. See note 4 supra.
22. Cm- JUSTICE MARSHALL, A RE-APPRAISAL. Williamsburg: College of
William and Mary, 1956. Pp. xxi, 185.
23. Crosskey, John Marshall and the Constitution, 23 U. Cm1. L. REv. 377
(1956).
24. Frankfurter, Chief Justice Marshall, 69 HARv. L. REv. 217 (1956).
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the general period of a Marshall anniversary, appropriately published a
note on his great foil, the Jeffersonian Chief Justice of Virginia who
matched the great Marshall decisions almost case by case with cogent
decisions to the contrary.25 As the note points out, had Adams not
made his midnight appointment of Marshall, Jefferson probably
would have appointed Roane Chief Justice of the United States.
John Marshall Harlan
The recent race cases, and the appointment of his grandson to the
high court, have sparked interest in Harlan I. Abraham pictures
Harlan as an emotional man of strong feelings who put his all into
his opinions, and often read them dramatically. .Conservative in eco-
nomics, liberal in civil rights.
Robert H. Jackson
Writing after the untimely death of Jackson, Frankfurter2 7 has
Jackson reflecting his native small city America with its easy pros-
perity, tolerance, distrust of authority. Rodel128 dubs Jackson, in
Galsworthian terms, the man of property who, after a career in
political "radicalism," on reaching the court reverted to his basic
conservatism. Fairman 29 enumerates the primary characteristics of
Jackson as an easy writing style, insistence on adequate records from
the lower courts, concern for accurate statutory interpretation, fear
of the search power, federalism in economics but not in criminal law.
Jaffe30 airs Jackson's use of the commerce and full faith and credit
clauses to further economic nationalism. Freund,31 after reference to
Jackson's latter-day remarks derisive of "judicial activism," recalls
his own activism in certain fields such as equal protection and free-
dom of religion. Weidner 32 finds Jackson more "restraintist" than
"activist." McDonough 33 laments Jackson's failure to clarify the
foreign divorce muddle, despite valiant effort.
Roger B. Taney
Swisher34 classifies the Jacksonian Chief Justice as a product of
25. Note, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1242 (1953).
26. Abraham, Harlan, a Justice Neglected, 41 VA. L. REV. 871 (1955).
27. Frankfurter, Justice Jackson, 55 CoLum. L. REV. 435 (1955), 68 HARV.
L. REV. 937 (1955).
28. See note 4 supra.
29. Fairman, Justice Jackson, 55 CoLum. L. Rv. 445 (1955).
30. Jaffe, Justice Jackson, 68 HARv. L. REV. 940 (1955).
31. Freund, Individual and Commonwealth in the Thought of Justice Jack-
son, 8 STAN. L. REV. 9 (1955).
32. Weidner, Justice Jackson and the Judicial Function, 53 MICH. L. REV.
567 (1955).
33. McDonough, Justice Jackson and Full Faith and Credit to Divorce De-
crees, 23 U. CI. L. REV. 860 (1956).
34. Swisher, Mr. Chief Justice Taney, in M. JUSTIcE, op. cit. supra note 10.
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states rights and provincialism, which makes him anathema to mod-
erns, Rodell 35 tilts a lance for Taney, praising him for decisions
favorable to the small citizens of the day. But, relative to Negroes,
his plantation rearing made him reactionary.
Felix Frankfurter
"Liberals" have tended to deplore Frankfurter in recent years.
Rodel136 paints Frankfurter somewhat darkly as a sometime liberal
who has retreated into form, etiquette, and continental dialectics,
from robust American statesmanship. Frank37 believes that some
justices of the high court were thrown into a trauma of hesitation by
the Court crises of the 30's. Mendelson 8 regards Frankfurter as mak-
ing a sincere across-the-board effort to apply the Holmes policy of
giving rein to legislative solutions, and having considerable respect
for history and precedent. This policy, in Holmes' era of liberal legis-
lation, made Holmes appear liberal. The same policy, in Frankfurter's
era of relatively conservative legislation, makes Frankfurter appear
conservative. Fortunately, Frankfurter is exceedingly able to take
care of himself in any battle of publicity. In a memorial to Marshall,39
Frankfurter analyzed himself, in Bagehotian terms, as an old-fashioned
liberal who believes in the application of our humane and gradualist
traditions to problems not amenable to quick and precipitate solu-
tions.
Williarm 0. Douglas
Rodell, 40 most sympathetic to Douglas, highlights his expanding
concept of civil rights and his continuation on the high court of the
Brandeis flair for unravelling economic complexities. Any impa-
tience with the details of law is excused as justified. Regret is expressed
that Douglas' superb executive talents are somewhat wasted on the
Court. Epstein,41 likewise, applauds Douglas' civil rights dynamics.
James Wilson
Smith,42 in a concise, popularly written biography, traces Wilson
from his native Scotland to his unfortunate end as a Supreme Court
justice fleeing his creditors. Along the way, however, this uncanny
35. See note 4 supra.
36. Ibid.
37. Frank, Court and Constitution: the Passive Period, 4 VAND. L. Rav. 400
(1951).
38. Mendelson, Justice Frankfurter and the Process of Judicial Review,
104 U. PA. L. REv. 295 (1954).
39. See note 24 supra.
40. See note 4 supra.
41. Epstein, Justice Douglas and Civil Liberties, 1951 Wis. L. REV. 125.
42. JAmES WxLSON: FOUNDING FATHER. By Charles P. Smith. Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1956. Pp. xiii, 394.
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Scot had enjoyed a remarkable career: trumpeter of the Revolution,
founding father, pioneer American law teacher whose jurisprudence
lectures were attended by the great of the day, unfortunate speculator
in western lands.
Harlan Fiske Stone
Mason,43 the sometime biographer of Brandeis, has just released a
fat and interesting volume on Stone. Early in the book, Mason pictures
Stone circa 1912 as a Columbia law professor, Republican conservative,,
and lawyers' lawyer ardently defending the courts against charges
by men such as Brandeis that they were using outworn legal theories
to emasculate needed social legislation, the professor deriding the do-
gooders, sociologists, and political fadists. By the 1920's, Stone is
ready to acknowledge social justice as one test of good law. But, only
on reaching the high court was Stone ready to embrace rather cau-
tiously the tenets of modern liberalism. Mason tends to contribute
the conversion to Holmes. However, by 1937, Stone, unlike the arch-
New Deal brethren, was ready to call a halt to the progression.
The book rather interestingly takes the reader behind the scenes
of the high court to view human foibles; the occasional flare-ups
over opinion assignments; the difficulty of fashioning opinions that
could muster a majority; the deletion of some of Holmes' more iinagi-
native flights; the alertness of the Justices to bar any impugnment of
their own previous formulations; occasional repercussions from the
Justices' off-court disclosures to intimates (Stone, apparently, was a
frequent offender prior to becoming Chief Justice); justices' concern
over the professional and public reception of their decisions. Stone's
tendency to write special opinions when voting with Holmes and
Brandeis is explained: he often found Holmes' opinions too cryptic
and Brandeis' too ruthless and involved.
On becoming Chief Justice, Stone introduced a town meeting at-
mosphere in the court conferences. This permitted greater considera-
tion of cases, but also made for discursiveness and development of
strong differences of opinion. Apparently, Stone thought that Hughes
had tended to favor certain Justices in opinion assignments, and he
attempted a more equitable distribution, but soon reverted to the
Hughes pattern, favoring Douglas, Frankfurter, and Roberts. The Court
evidently had great difficulty with the Communist and the Military
Tribunal cases. Fear for the erosion of civil rights is said to have
prompted Stone's controversial footnote in the Carolene Products case,
urging a preferred position for civil rights vis-a-vis economic rights.
Rodel1 44 suggests that there was a bit of rivalry between Stone and
43. See note 5 supra.
44. See note 4 supra.
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Frankfurter for the role of the Holmes-Brandeis mantle. Dunham45
notes Stone's sincere attempt to avoid "personal predilections" in the
New Deal cases, some of which he regretted.
Owen J. Roberts
Recent writing on Roberts centers on the much-discussed question
of whether he was pressured to change his approach at the height of
the Court-FDR contest. Frankfurter,46 in a memorial to Roberts, after
characterizing Roberts as a modest, retiring, lawyers' lawyer who
purposely wrote narrowed, unprovocative opinions, relays an ex-
planation from Roberts himself that he was not pressured; that he had
resolved to change his approach prior to the crisis, and that the Par-
rish case was delayed in release by the illness of Stone. Griswold47
notes that Roberts was a long-time lawyer's lawyer who deprecated the
introduction of social science materials into the law. Griswold also
concludes that the court records relative the dates of the Tipaldo and
Parrish cases lend support to the Roberts story relayed to Frankfurter,
above.
The Cousins Hand
This formidable pair, who wrote so much of the outstanding lower
federal court law of our time, were fulsomely saluted as they ap-
proached retirement. At an American Law Institute dinner honoring
-Learned, Judge John J. Parker read the Hand opinions as not only
laying down great law but reflecting the greatness qualities of honesty,
courage, kindness, and a deep sense of justice. Whitney North Seymour
posed civilization itself as the boundary of Hand's intellectual horizon.
Frankfurter warned against losing the man in the legend.48 Lancaster 49
stresses Learned's distrust of the "judicial activism" concept. Clark 0
distinguishes Learned and Augustus: Learned as brilliant, eloquent,
speculative, and dramatic; Augustus as wise, unswerving, less emo-
tional or dramatic. Dilliard5' has collected some of the choicer writings
of Learned in a concise, handsomely bound volume.
Hugo L. Black
The progress of Black from controversial newcomer to senior justice
of the high court has been hailed by several writers. Douglas5 2 attrib-
45. Dunham, Mr. Justice Stone, in MR. JUSTICE, op. cit. supra note 10.
46. Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 311 (1955).
47. Griswold, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 332 (1955).
48. Note, 37 A.B.A.J. 502 (1951).
49. Lancaster, Learned Hand and the Limits of Judicial Discretion, 9 VAND.
L. Rnv. 427 (1955).
50. Clark, Augustus Noble Hand, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1955).
51. THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY. Edited by Irving Dilliard. New York: Knopf,
1952. Pp. xxvii, 262.
52. Douglas, Mr. Justice Black, 65 YALE L.J. 449 (1956).
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utes to Black a passion for facts, a diligent scholar's distrust of general
propositions, and a liberal's respect for civil rights. Rostow 53 ob-
serves the following stars in the "constitutional universe" of Black:
leaving application of interstate commerce controls to the legisla-
tures, especially, Congress; and "activist" Court monitoring of leg-
islation relative to civil rights; close scrutiny of executive action.
Frank,M after opining that Black had amply fulfilled Senator Norris'
prediction that he would represent the common man on the Court,
finds Black occupying a somewhat lonely position on the Court today
as a "liberal" of the 1930's vintage. Rodell,55 a Black fan, hails him as
the intellectual leader of the present Court, capable of super-Holmes-
ian eloquence, but at times tending to become too academic.
Fred Vinson
The Truman Chief Justice has been under some attack by "liberal"
commentators for his court's re-orientation of free speech law and its
more cautious appeals policy in procedural due process cases. Rodell
56
is vigorously critical on these scores. However, he credits Vinson with
a broad concept of federal power, an heritage from his long pre-court
federal career. Frank57 also notes Vinson's strong federal government
slant, and that, generally, he wrote curt, practical, conciliatory opin-
ions. Frank doubts that information is yet available on how far Vin-
son influenced his Court.
George Sutherland
Paschal58 poses Sutherland as the intellectual leader of the conserva-
tive wing of the Supreme Court in the 20's-30's. His conservatism de-
rived from his personal temperament, his formative years in the
period West, and his devotion to the teachings of Herbert Spencer and
Thomas Cooley. On occasion, when he could recall from his Senate
days investigatory facts on a subject, he could be "modern." Relative
to foreign affairs and war, he was ready to concede broad powers to
the federal government.
Joseph P. Bradley
Fairman59 gives Bradley, rather than Waite, credit for the Court
result in the Granger cases of the 1870's such as Munn v. Illinois.
53. Rostow, Mr. Justice Black, 65 YALE L.J. 451 (1956).
54. Frank, Mr. Justice Black, 65 YALE L.J. 454 (1956).
55. See note 4 supra.
56. Ibid.
57. Frank, Fred Vinson and the Chief Justiceship, 21 U. CH. L. REV. 212
(1954).
58. Paschal, Mr. Justice Sutherland, in MiR. JUSTICE, op. cit. supra note 10.
See also MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND: A MAN AGAINST THE STATE. By Joel F.
Paschal. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951. Pp. xii, 265.




Fahy60 notes that Murphy came to the high court without much
academic or judicial experience, but with a well-formed political
philosophy of liberalism acquired during a long and varied political
career. Specifications of his liberalism included broad protection of
citizen civil rights, strict construction of subpoenas of all types, judicial
scrutiny of police procedures. Weiss6' distinguishes Murphy's opinions
by their feel for the human, individual or group, equations and inter-
ests involved.
Mahlon Pitney
Levitan,62 noting that Pitney was assigned many of the great labor
union cases of his time, the decisions being against the unions, con-
cludes that Pitney was not against unions per se, but merely, like
many lawyers of his time, concerned over their power potential qua
giant organizations and their susceptibility to "radical" action. He
was sympathetic to workman's compensation legislation.
Horace Gray
Davis and Davis63 portray Gray as a learned Boston lawyer, aloof,
highly analytical, a stickler for cohesion and manners who was a ter-
ror to fuzzy or breezy counsel. At times an upholder of federal power,
at other times an upholder of state power. He once coldly heard
President Arthur castigate one of his opinions.
Wiley Rutledge
Stevens6 depicts Rutledge as a slow, careful thinker and writer,
his opinions being thorough and, more than most, exploratory of the
opinions of the courts below. A composite memorial Note in the Iowa
Law Review has the Chief Justice, the Attorney-General, and the
Solicitor-General speaking of Rutledge as a careful, painstaking crafts-
man who saw constitutional problems as accommodations of power
conflicts.6
Lemuel Shaw
Levy6 emphasizes the pioneer work in carrier law of the eminent
Nineteenth-Century Chief Justice of Massachusetts. Inevitably, in a
60. Fahy, The Judicial Philosophy of Justice Murphy, 60 YALE L.J. 812
(1951).
61. Weiss, Justice Murphy and the Welfare Question, 53 MIcH. L. REV. 541
(1955).
62. Levitan, Mahlon Pitney-Labor Judge, 40 VA. L. REV. 733 (1955).
63. Davis and Davis, Mr. Justice Gray: Some Aspects of His Judicial
Career, 41 A.B.A.J. 421 (1955).
64. Stevens, Mr. Justice Rutledge, in MR. JUSTICE, op. cit. supra note 10.
65. Memorial Remarks in the Supreme Court, 36 IbwA L. REV. 591 (1951).
66. Levy, Chief Justice Shaw and the Formative Period of American Railroad
Law, 51 COLTM. L. REv. 327 (1951). See also THE LAw OF THE COMMONWEALTH
AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAw. By Leonard W. Levy. Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1957. Pp. viii, 383.
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time when the primary concern was to get the roads built, Shaw con-
ferred considerable powers on the railroads, but he entered caveats
which could be used as basis for the later needed regulations of the
roads.
CONCLUSION
The reviewer wishes to offer excuses to any biography writers of the
period covered whose material is omitted. Such omission may be due
to unavailability, cumulativeness, or doubt of the biographical nature
of the material. The reviewer also humbly apologizes in advance to
any writer who may feel that his work has been wrongly summarized
due either to the reviewer's denseness or his excessive condensation.
Finally, in all respectfulness, the reviewer promises any judges
"covered" that, so far as he is concerned, they may sit or rest in peace
for some time to come.
